ABSTRACT We use “mind” in language on a regular basis. But what does it mean to have a mind? Within moral psychology, mind perception refers to the act of ascribing a mind, characterized in terms of mental and emotional capacities, to others. As the U.S. becomes increasingly diverse, we are interested in how people conceptualize minds, and how their conceptions of the mind affect how they treat individuals from diverse social groups. However, research to date takes an “identity‐neutral” approach to mind perception in that it overlooks the identities of perceivers and the target characters they are perceiving. In this paper, we draw on moral psychology research on mind perception, developmental and intergroup psychology, intersectional and critical perspectives, and consciousness theory to argue for the need to include identity in mind perception work. In doing so, we outline the theoretical and practical benefits of nuancing current mind perception research to include identity. Finally, we provide three concrete strategies to include identity in research on mind perception, organized by their potential to inform work that could make strong theoretical contributions. Thus, we aim to provide a framework for how researchers can build rigorous models of mind perception that are representative of an increasingly diverse society.
Zutshi et al. (Sun,) studied this question.