Abstract When does a state’s reputation for resolve transfer across separate international crises and deter future challengers? We propose three assumptions underlying “Cross-Crisis Reputational Deterrence” (CCRD). First, a defender’s response to a crisis leads a new challenger to reassess the defender’s reputation (reputation formation). Second, the new challenger draws inferences about how the defender would behave in a different future crisis scenario (transfer of reputation). Third, anticipating the defender’s response, the challenger changes its preferences (deterrence by reputation). We test the CCRD logic by examining whether the initial US response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine impacted Chinese assertiveness toward Taiwan. A framing experiment in China in March 2022 finds that a weak US response to Russian aggression decreases perceptions of US resolve but does not ultimately impact Chinese attitudes toward Taiwan. Our findings illustrate the conditions under which CCRD is more or less likely to occur in international politics.
Myrick et al. (Fri,) studied this question.