This article compares insider dealing enforcement in Jordan and France to identify which combinations of substantive legal rules and institutional design produce credible deterrence in capital markets. Using a doctrinal-comparative method, the analysis evaluates (i) the legal definition of inside information, (ii) the elements of liability, (iii) sanction design and procedural safeguards, and (iv) enforcement architecture, including administrative sanctioning and its relationship to criminal prosecution. The article argues that Jordan’s framework is functionally oriented but under-specifies key constraints that structure enforcement in mature market-abuse regimes. The main gaps concern precision and material price sensitivity within the definition of inside information, and institutional capacity to investigate and sanction quickly. A further tension appears where broad, largely objective liability and evidentiary presumptions coexist with modest expected sanction severity in practice. By contrast, the French and EU approach combines a granular definition of inside information with strong administrative enforcement capacity and coordinated interaction between administrative and criminal tracks under due process constraints. The article proposes a reform package for Jordan that tightens definitional elements, clarifies fault standards across insider categories, recalibrates sanctions to reflect illicit gain and market impact, and introduces an independent administrative sanctioning mechanism with robust procedural guarantees. These measures aim to improve enforceability, proportionality, and investor confidence while aligning Jordan’s regime with IOSCO expectations for effective market-abuse deterrence. • Defines deterrence metric for insider dealing enforcement in emerging markets • Benchmarks Jordan’s inside information definition against EU MAR constraints • Shows how weak precision, materiality, and capacity undermine deterrence in Jordan • Explains French/EU dual-track enforcement with due-process safeguards • Offers design options: clarify fault, scale sanctions, add admin sanctioning body
Khalaileh et al. (Thu,) studied this question.