Greece poses challenges to participatory fishery governance in Europe, as Greek fishers are known for their independent nature and mistrust of the authorities. However, little attention has been paid to evidence of fishers’ collectivity in local fishery governance in certain parts of Greece, which is important for developing effective fishery governance systems. Fish exploitation in the Messolonghi-Aitoliko Lagoon in Western Greece depends on the ivari (plural ivaria), a barrier-trap fishery operated by fishers’ cooperatives with fishing rights assigned by the authorities. To examine the communal aspect of Greek fishers, this study demonstrates how local fishers in the lagoon organize themselves as cooperatives and how they collectively engage in the ivari fishery within the framework of a rights-based governance system. Economic productivity disparities between the cooperatives are major factors for their “good” or “bad” management perceived by the authorities. However, this study revealed that differences in social formation and shared interests also affect cooperative management strategies. The social connections of individual fishers shape the multiple attributes of cooperatives as family-run, fellowship-based, or entrepreneurship-oriented, which influences how they commit themselves to the ivari fishery. Fishers’ participation in collective action is supported by their social relationships, their own consent, and the freedom to join or leave cooperatives at their own discretion. The dynamics of management strategies for securing ivari rights represent how Greek fishers not only pursue their interests collectively among members but also competitively between cooperatives within the rights-based governance system.
Sakita Seishiro (Sat,) studied this question.