This paper analyses Arendt’s concept of political sentiment, specifically focusing on pity and solidarity. By interpreting Arendt’s text, I reveal that Arendt had an ambiguous understanding of the two concepts. The paper severs to clarify her notion that, although solidarity largely aligns with the sentiment of pity, its nature (by which it partakes of reason) makes it distinct from pity. Ultimately, solidarity is also a principle of action. This paper elaborates on the nature of pity and solidarity, contending that they lead to separate modes of interaction. While pity treats non-sufferers with cruelty and boundless violence, solidarity treats them with retaliation and bonded violence. Therefore, I argue that the interactive mode appropriate for pity is fraternity, which is not suitable for solidary action. The final aim of this paper is to discover the political implication of solidarity, contending that despite the difficulties faced by sufferers performing solidary actions, they still have possibilities to overcome these difficulties. Hence, they can say ‘we must be friends’ to their former enemies once their struggle ends.
Kun-Feng Tu (Wed,) studied this question.