The international security system is undergoing significant threats of destabilization, which results in an increase in the number of political and military conflicts and their duration. In the context of the transformation of the world order and the strengthening of the role of military force in the actions of actors in world politics, special attention is required to re-evaluate algorithms for the formation of forecasting and planning systems for political and military conflicts through the prism of an «exit strategy» from the post-conflict phase of military operations. The article endeavors to analyze the features of the strategic forecasting, planning and management system under the administration of George W. Bush of the military operation in Iraq as one of the most representative cases at present after the collapse of the bipolar system of international security. The purpose of the study is to identify the main universal systemic factors influencing the success of the post-conflict phase of intervention, which must be taken into account when modeling any political-military conflict. The study also attempts to get ahead of certain features of interagency interaction in the Bush administration as well as other authorities involved in the intervention planning process. Special attention is paid to the need to correctly determine the nature of the conflict in the context of organizational risks of the planning and management process in the system of state decision-making to level the threats of defeat or “get bogged down” in modern regional and global crisis situations, armed conflicts and wars.
Ilya V. Tretyakov (Thu,) studied this question.