In the context of increasing market uncertainty and the integration of blockchain technology in low‐carbon markets, this research investigates supply chain coordination between manufacturers and remanufacturers, focusing on price competition and carbon reduction technology collaboration. We employ a dual‐game theoretical framework combining non‐cooperative game theory for optimal pricing determination and cooperative game theory for establishing emission reduction targets and profit distribution via the Shapley value. Our analysis examines the impact of carbon trading price volatility, demand uncertainty, emission reduction efficiency, and consumer green preferences on strategic decision‐making. Our findings reveal three critical insights. First, the hybrid non‐cooperative–cooperative game model effectively balances competitive pricing with collaborative carbon reduction strategies. Second, when carbon reduction costs exceed a critical threshold, both manufacturers and remanufacturers must increase product prices while enhancing emission reduction efforts to maintain competitiveness and environmental sustainability. Third, carbon price fluctuations disproportionately benefit remanufacturers with higher emission reduction efficiency, demonstrating the competitive advantage conferred by advanced carbon reduction technologies. This study advances theoretical understanding of manufacturing–remanufacturing optimization in complex market environments and provides practical strategic guidance for enterprises and policymakers. The research contributes to developing sustainable economic ecosystems that reconcile economic benefits with environmental protection objectives.
Zhao et al. (Thu,) studied this question.