Following the end of World War I and the November Revolution, Germany’s military and civilian authorities found themselves in a difficult situation: on the one hand, they needed to demobilize the Kaiser’s army and form new armed forces; on the other, they needed to ensure the viability of the republic under pressure from both left and right political forces. The severity of the Versailles restrictions, particularly in the area of armaments and the size of the Reichswehr, led to the sabotage of the demands of the Entente allies from the republic’s early years. A consensus emerged among both Germany’s political and military elites to implement strategic efforts to overcome the current situation. Tactical approaches — delaying disarmament processes, conducting covert rearmament, preparing a mobilization reserve, and diplomatic steps aimed at strengthening defensive and offensive potential — were already evident in the early 1920s, and the political upheavals of 1923 only intensified these processes.
Konstantin Sofronov (Wed,) studied this question.
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