Abstract How do European Union (EU) fiscal allocations affect the electoral performance of corrupt incumbent governments? While existing research links EU funds to governance quality and corruption, less is known about how these resources interact with domestic political incentives to shape electoral outcomes. This article advances a theory of corruption compensation , arguing that EU transfers provide politically vulnerable incumbents with discretionary resources that can be redirected to consolidate electoral support. Using data on EU fiscal allocations and electoral outcomes in twenty-six member states between 2000 and 2015, the analysis shows that higher levels of EU funding are associated with larger electoral margins for governing parties in countries with high executive corruption. These effects are absent in less corrupt contexts. The findings suggest that, under weak domestic accountability and limited enforcement, EU fiscal instruments unintentionally reinforce illiberal governance and weaken the regulatory objectives of cohesion policy. The article highlights the need to integrate political risk considerations more systematically into the design and implementation of EU spending conditionality.
Albana Shehaj (Thu,) studied this question.