Justice and the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions

Abstract The prospect of dangerous climate change requires Humanity to limit the emission of greenhouse gases. This in turn raises the question of how the permission to emit greenhouse gases should be distributed and among whom. In this article the author criticises three principles of distributive justice that have often been advanced in this context. He also argues that the predominantly statist way in which the question is framed occludes some morally relevant considerations. The latter part of the article turns from critique and advances a new way of addressing the problem. In particular, first, it proposes four key theses that should guide our normative analysis; and, second, it outlines how these four theses can be realised in practice. Keywords: equalitygrandfatheringgreenhouse gas emissionsjusticehistorical responsibility Notes This article was written while I held an ESRC Climate Change Leadership Fellowship (2008–2011) and I am very grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for its support. The article has been presented as a paper at the conference on 'Ethics and Climate Change: Scenarios for Justice and Sustainability' at Padova (23–25 October 2008), at the Oxford-Princeton workshop on 'Global Norms and Global Justice' (30 October 2008), at the seminar at the Warwick Centre for Ethics, Law and Public Affairs (4 February 2009), at the Smith School for Enterprise and the Environment (23 February 2009), and at the 'Environmental Norms, Institutions, and Policy' seminar series at Stanford (5 March 2009). I am grateful to the audiences at these occasions and am particularly grateful to Robin Attfield, Göran Duus-Otterström, Dave Frame, Lauren Hartzell, David King, David Miller, Ed Page, Debra Satz, Steve Schneider, Kai Spiekermann, Zosia Stemplowska, Victor Tadros, Andrew Walton, and Andrew Williams for their questions. I owe a special debt to Bob Keohane, my commentator at the Oxford-Princeton workshop, and to Avia Pasternak, my commentator at Stanford, for their illuminating suggestions; to Aubrey Meyer for his helpful comments and discussion; to Don Maier for his lengthy written comments; to Narasimha Rao for advice about empirical material on India and China; and to Jay Gregg for helpful correspondence about measurements of China's carbon emissions. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 'Cumulative CO2 Emissions'. Available at http://www.pewclimate.org/facts-and-figures/international/cumulative. Table 1 is not fully comprehensive. A number of scientists and economists have proposed 'geo-engineering' solutions, so this should arguably be added to the set of responsibilities. Geo-engineering has been challenged on scientific and ethical grounds and so I shall set it aside here. I have discussed it elsewhere (Caney Citationforthcoming). See, for example, S. Socolow and R. Pacala's important and influential article (Socolow and Pacala Citation2004). This is not intended as a criticism of this important paper. The point is that before deciding whether to implement their proposal for 15 separate 'wedges' one needs to ascertain how the costs associated with this programme would be distributed and whether their scheme can be designed so that the burden is distributed equitably. They cite the International Energy Agency Citation(2002). This historical principle should be distinguished from another historical principle that some might invoke to criticise grandfathering. Some might argue that if one group of people have already enjoyed access to a scarce good (in this case, using the earth's absorptive capacity), it is reasonable to require them to give way so that others can now have access to it. The thought is simply that standard accounts of the acquisition of some scarce resource invoke some kind of proviso. The best-known example of this kind of view is, of course, John Locke's 'proviso' governing the use of natural resources. See Locke Citation(1986 1690), chapter 5 ('Of Property'), §27. The point is expressed nicely by John Rawls's famous statement: 'to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice' (Rawls Citation1999, 116). My argument here is indebted to G.A. Cohen's critique of Rawls's treatment of talented people. Cohen first expressed this critique in 'Incentives, Inequality, and Community' (Cohen Citation1991), especially section 3 and Cohen's 'kidnapper' argument in section 4. The argument is restated in his recent Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008, chapter 1). Of course some might seek to give more principled (as opposed to pragmatic) arguments for grandfathering, hoping to show that it is in fact a fair distributive principle. For example, some might try to defend grandfathering on the grounds that people are entitled not to have their expectations thwarted. For discussion, see Gosseries (Citation2005, 297–301). See also Neumayer Citation2000, 185–92, Singer Citation2002, 43; Attfield Citation2003, 179–80. See also http://www.gci.org.uk/. See Rawls (Citation1999, 78–81) for Rawls's account of primary goods, and Dworkin (Citation2000, 65–119) for Dworkin on equality of resources. This point has also been forcefully made by Derek Bell (Citation2008, 250) and David Miller Citation(forthcoming). See also Caney Citation(2009b). See again Miller's Citation(forthcoming) incisive critique of the equal per capita view. See also Neumayer (Citation2002, 7–12). It might be argued that those who live in hot countries also need high levels of energy to cool themselves. Neumayer (Citation2004, 37–9) finds, however, that this is not the case. See on this the discussions by Lackner, Grimes, and Ziock Citation(2001) and by Keith, Ha-Duong, and Stolaroff (Citation2006, 17–45). See also the discussion of the work by Klaus Lackner by Kunzig and Broecker Citation(2008), especially chapters 14 and 15. The terminology of 'subsistence emissions' and 'luxury emissions' comes from Shue Citation(1993). Neumayer, for example, starts from the claim that each person has a right to emit an equal per capita amount carbon dioxide but then seeks to adjust each person's entitlements in light of their country's 'Historical Emission Debt' (Neumayer Citation2000, 186). This presupposes that countries are a morally significant unit such that if a nineteenth-century Briton emits more than his allotted quota then a later Briton is entitled to a correspondingly smaller quota. Why 'nations' or 'states' should be the appropriate reference group is unclear. Which entities should be treated as the rights-holders of emission rights is discussed later. Note that differential access to clean energy sources matters not simply in cases where it entails that people have unequal ability to meet basic needs. The issue is a more fundamental one: why should one equalise one energy source without regard to access to other energy sources? Perhaps those who maintain greenhouse gas sinks could be given extra emission permits. This proposal was referred to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). See Secretariat of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (2001). For other versions of this third point, see Singer Citation2002, 34; Gosseries Citation2004, 40–1; and Baer Citation2006, 136. Cf. Neumayer Citation2000, especially 186; and Bode Citation2004. For further pertinent analysis of China's emissions embodied in international trade, see Wang and Watson Citation2007; Leggett, Logan and Mackey Citation2008, 14–16; and Weber et al. Citation2008. See also, more generally, Peters and Hertwitch Citation2008). For discussion of consumer-based and producer-based perspectives (and its application to Denmark), see Rothman Citation1998; and Munksgaard and Alsted Pederson Citation2001. This third example was suggested by the FAQs section of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). See question 11 (http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html#Q11) and Tom Boden's response. Boden (director of CDIAC) writes, 'Many small island nations have military bases that are used for re-fueling or have large tourist industries. Who do you assign the emissions to; the US whose military planes are re-fueling on the Wake Island with aviation and jet fuel or the Wake Island?' I am not saying that no argument could be given that could justify this pooling. My point is just that we need an argument for this inference. (I do doubt, though, that any human rights based argument could establish that the citizens' individual rights could legitimately be held by their state independently of how unjust and illiberal it is.) I owe this point to Cameron Hepburn. See, again, the points made by Bell Citation2008, especially 250–1 and 254; Caney Citation2009b; and Miller Citationforthcoming. See James Tobin's interesting discussion of 'specific egalitarianism' (Tobin Citation1970, 264: cf. further 263–77). There have been extensive debates about whether the destruction of natural goods can be compensated for by the creation of human capital; for discussion, see Dobson Citation1998. This possibility is noted by Axel Gosseries. He, though, does not explore option (b) and adopts an (a)-like approach (Gosseries Citation2005, 296). Gosseries says that (a) is closer to what is being applied by the Kyoto Protocol. It is not clear why, however, we should be guided here by what is actually happening in practice. Furthermore, if we are to be guided by what is occurring in practice, then it bears noting that recent developments in the EU ETS fit well with option (b) (see section on 'An alternative approach: practice'). Gosseries also suggests that (a) fits better with egalitarian thinking (2005, 296), but this is not self-evident. I can see no reason why egalitarians cannot endorse (b). For information, see http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/home/index.cfm and https://www.pfd.state.ak.us/. The content of Article IX section 15 can be found at http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/fundlaw/constAndLaw.cfm. For further information about the Alaskan Permanent Fund, see Anderson Citation2002. For a contrary view (and defence of his preferred alternative), see Steiner Citation1999. In Henry Shue's nice phrase, emitting greenhouse gases is an 'avoidable necessity' (Shue Citation1995). It is 'necessary' because many people need to be able to emit greenhouses gases to achieve a minimum standard of living. And it is 'avoidable' because this necessity arises because major political and economic actors have designed and perpetuated an energy regime that it is heavily reliant on the use of fossil fuels. Those elites could redesign our energy regime in ways that are more energy efficient and utilise other energy sources. This is compatible with some people being entitled to none where they have secure access to renewable energy sources. For analysis of the global commons and the common ownership of the atmosphere, see Risse Citation(2008). See also http://www.earthinc.org/. For my own defence of an auction system, see Caney Citation(forthcoming). An auction scheme is also defended by Ross Garnaut in Garnaut (Citation2008, chapter 14, especially 331–2). The case for auctioning permits to emit greenhouse gases has also been advanced by Hepburn et al. Citation2006. One might go one step further and argue that the revenues raised should be spent wherever they would have the greatest effect. We thus face a choice between hypothecating the funds and using them to address climate change or spending them in those ways which result in the greatest benefit. The latter might seem to be the most rational. However, against this it is arguable that hypothecation produces stable supplies of money and, moreover, that spending the revenues on other areas will simply result in a decrease in the other funds being spent on those other areas. For good discussions of the rationale for hypothecation, see Müller Citation(2008) and Oxfam and WWF Citation(2008).