This paper proposes a structural-ontological theory of imprint, defined as the condition of possibility for distinction as such. The imprint is not an entity, property, or relation, but the non-generative and non-observable condition under which distinctions such as subject/object, cause/effect, and generation/result become possible. Rather than treating form as a metaphysical essence, the paper redefines ontology as the stabilization of differentiability. Existence is therefore understood not as the presence of beings but as the structured possibility of distinction. The paper further examines Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Science of Logic, focusing on the structure of retrospective determination, in which determinations are constituted from their results. It argues that this structure presupposes a condition that cannot be fully internalized within systematic closure, which is termed the non-recuperability of retrospective determination. The paper develops a non-representational, structural account of ontology rather than a historical interpretation of Hegel.
Yugo Hidaka (Sun,) studied this question.