This paper introduces the Gazer as a structural concept that separates subjectivity from personal identity. Its point of departure is the delay of recognition: whatever becomes available to recognition has already been made past and fixed in what this paper calls corpse-form. This consequence also applies to self-recognition. What appears as "this I" is already a past form and therefore appears as "that I," a pseudo-subject in corpse-form. The standard question of personal identity is thereby reformulated. The issue is not whether "that I A" is identical with "this I B," but whether "that I A" and "that I B," both already fixed as pseudo-subjects, appear as the same trajectory. The Gazer names the seeing side that retreats whenever it is named. It is not a hidden observer, a substantial self, or an unsayable mystery. Rather, it marks the structural fact that every attempt to fix the one who sees leaves behind only another pseudo-subject, while the seeing side remains unfixed. Brief comparisons with Husserl, Sartre, and Wittgenstein situate the Gazer in relation to time-consciousness, the gaze, and the non-objectivity of the subject, while showing that it is irreducible to any of them. The paper closes by extending the structure to the question of detection: wherever direct facing, corpse-formation, and retreat are sustained, the Gazer remains as an open question, not as the property of any particular kind of being.
Akira Hattori (Tue,) studied this question.