Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy

We all know what Kant means by autonomy: “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” ( G , 4:440), or, since any law must be universal, the condition of an agent who is “subject only to laws given by himself but still universal ” ( G , 4:432). Or do we know what Kant means by autonomy? There are a number of questions here. First, Kant's initial definition of autonomy itself raises the question of why the property of the will being a law to itself should be equivalent to its independence from any property of objects of volition. It is also natural to ask, how does autonomy as Kant conceives it relate to more familiar notions of freedom. For example, consider Locke's conception of freedom as the condition of a person “to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind,” rather than according to the preference or direction of any other person. What is the relation between autonomy and this traditional conception of freedom as the liberty of an agent? And what is the relation of autonomy to the traditional conception of freedom of the will; that is, the condition that obtains, as G. E.