Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
List of tables and figures Series editors' preface Acknowledgements Part I. Why Have Hierarchy?: 1. Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationality 2. Bargaining failure: coordination, bargaining, and contracts 3. Voting failure: social choice in a dictatorial hierarchy Part II. Managerial Dilemmas: 4. Horizontal dilemmas: social choice in a decentralised hierarchy 5. Vertical dilemmas: piece-rate incentives and credible commitments 6. Hidden action in hierarchies: principals, agents, and teams 7. Hidden information in hierarchies: the logical limits of mechanism design 8. Hierarchical failures and market solutions: can competition create efficient incentives for managers? Part III. Cooperation and Leadership: 9. The possibilities of cooperation: repeated vertical dilemmas 10. The indeterminacy of cooperation: conventions, culture, and commitments 11. The political economy of hierarchy: commitment, leadership and property rights Epilogue: politics, rationality, and efficiency References Name index Subject index.
Voss et al. (1993) studied this question.