Institutions over Individuals: The Role of Government Type in Demonstrating Resolve during International Crises

Abstract Which government type—presidential or parliamentary—leads adversaries to perceive democratic leaders as more resolved when making militarized threats? While existing literature offers several explanations for demonstrating resolve based on relative capabilities, strategic interests, costly signaling, reputation, and audience costs, I suggest that government type is one of the primary factors affecting how democratic leaders’ resolve is perceived during international crises. My argument is that leaders in presidential systems are more likely to demonstrate resolve than their parliamentary counterparts because presidential systems provide greater autonomy from legislative constraints, more centralized executive authority, and fixed terms with longer tenures, making presidents appear more independent, decisive, and capable of following through on threats. I test this hypothesis in a quantitative analysis using a mixed-effects logistic regression. The findings highlight the importance of domestic institutional structures in shaping the perception of resolve by target states during international crises.