ABSTRACT: This paper examines the slow-paced defense cooperation in the EAC, which contradicts treaty commitments and regional security demands. It argues that, notwithstanding conditions warranting defense cooperation in East Africa, Sovereignty Concerns incentivize EAC partner states’ self-restriction to defense confidence-building measures through issue differentiation, issue avoidance, and unilateralism. Qualitative desk and field research reveals that the EAC vaguely separates defense from other security issues: the organization restricts itself regarding common military defense decisions and actions; eschews situations requiring combined military formations, joint forces, specialized-service commands, battlegroups, and armaments cooperation; and EAC Partner states prefer unilateral military interventions to joint/combined responses to military problems. By tenaciously holding onto their sovereignty, cooperating states can hamper progress in defense cooperation.
Sabastiano Rwengabo (Sun,) studied this question.