Landscape Evaluation: The Theoretical Vacuum

The empirical methodology of landscape evaluation could be strengthened if it were underpinned by a more convincing theoretical base, but there is no general understanding of how this might be done. This introductory paper poses three main questions: first, what, in any context do we expect of a theory; second, how, in the present context, does the weakness of theory adversely affect our methodology; and third, what can we do about it. IN reviewing the attempts so far made to evaluate landscape aesthetically, most people would agree that techniques of evaluation are overwhelmingly dominated by an empirical methodology, that they could be greatly strengthened if they were underpinned by a more convincing theoretical base, but that it is not clear exactly how such an underpinning could effectively be made. When we are considering the practicalities of landscape evaluation it is this last problem which emerges as crucial, and it may help if we tackle it by posing three questions. First, 'What, in any context, do we expect of a theory ?'; second, 'How, in the present context, does the weakness, or even absence, of theory adversely affect our methodology ?', and third, 'What can we do about it?' First, then, what do we expect of a theory ? It might help if we were to examine briefly the relationship between empirical and theoretical techniques in an example drawn from a different field. A medical diagnosis commonly begins with an empirical phase, in which a questionnaire establishes the signs (that is those manifestations of disorder which can be directly observed by the enquirer) and the symptoms (that is those which are perceived, correctly or incorrectly, by the patient). On the basis of such a questionnaire we may observe that a patient has a blotchy rash on the face and chest, small spots in the mouth, a running nose and eyes, and a raised temperature. From his own perception of his condition we may also learn that he experiences the sensation of a sore throat and a headache. To make the further assertion that the patient is suffering from measles we need a measure of theory, if only at an elementary level, so that we can relate the observed phenomena of the individual case to the general principles by which we can attribute those phenomena to the disease we call measles and not to some other disorder. Let us, by comparison, look at our own methodology in the aesthetic evaluation of landscape. Do we use the information acquired from our questionnaire to lead us into a body of theoretical knowledge which enables us to identify a condition, to prescribe, if necessary, a procedural intervention for remedying or ameliorating that condition, and to predict the consequences of this or some other intervention, basing our diagnosis, prescription and prognosis on our understanding of the known principles which govern this field of human experience ? Do we not rather stick at the empirical stage without ever reaching the underlying principles ? I am not suggesting, of course, that those who evaluate landscape have no principles, but we must be careful not to confuse those principles which underlie the aesthetic pleasure we obtain from landscape with those principles by which we seek to regularize-perhaps even standardize-the procedures we apply to the investigation of particular cases. It may further help to clarify our problem if we recognize that geographers commonly employ two kinds of theory, which we may call 'spatial' and 'non-spatial'. 'Spatial theory' is the proper concern of their discipline. It consists of general propositions about the distribution, location and spatial relationships of phenomena, and it may extend not only to description, but also to explanation and prediction. Increasingly spatial theory has tended to find expression in mathematical terms, involving, for instance, models or formulae; but it need not be so expressed. It may take the form of a statement, quantitative