The Social Communication of Political Expertise

citizens is called into question. This article focuses on (1) the criteria that people employ in making judgments with respect to the political competence of other individuals, (2) the consequences of these judgments for the pattern and frequency of political communication, and (3) the implications for the effectiveness of collective deliberation among citizens. The database is taken from a study of political communication in the 1996 election, built on interviews with registered voters and their discussants in the Indianapolis and St. Louis metropolitan areas. he ability of citizens to identify political expertise and knowledge among others lies near the core of the political communication process at both individual and collective levels. If one individual recognizes the presence (or absence) of expertise among other citizens, the potential is created for the enhancement of political capacity within the electorate. The whole might indeed become greater than the sum of its parts, and social communication would provide one element of a solution to the public opinion paradox-individual citizens who appear woefully uninformed compared to an aggregate electorate that behaves in a predictable and sensible manner (Converse 1964; Page and Shapiro 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Indeed, to the extent that one citizen obtains political information and guidance from other citizens who are relatively more knowledgeable and informed, an asymmetrical process of social communication creates a multiplier effect on the distribution of expertise within the electorate. Those who employ socially communicated expertise may or may not become more politically expert themselves. The important point is that they might act on the basis of shared expertise obtained through countless social exchanges (see Katz 1957). In short, social communication creates the potential for modest amounts of political expertise to go a long way in enhancing the performance of democratic politics. But are people able to render valid judgments regarding the expertise of others? Do they discriminate among associates based on individual levels of expertise? Or is the social communication of political expertise swamped by other considerations, most particularly by the presence or absence of shared political perspectives between individuals? What are the implications for political deliberation and for the enhancement of political capacity on the part of individuals and electorates? This article focuses on (1) the criteria that people employ in making judgments with respect to the political competence of other individuals, (2) the consequences of these judgments for the frequency of political discussion with particular individuals, and (3) the resulting implications for the