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June 14, 2026Arbitration International0 citations

The P v D judgment and the delicate balance in cross-examination: new developments six years on

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SMSebastián Green Martínez

Key Points

  • This comment aims to analyze the P v D case and its implications for procedural fairness in arbitration.
  • Examined the P v D case and the resulting legal standards regarding procedural fairness.
  • Reviewed subsequent court decisions—including Obrascon, Tenke Fungurume, and BPY v MXV—for their treatment of the P v D precedent.
  • Discussed the enforcement of section 33 duties and cross-examination principles relevant to arbitral awards.
  • The English Commercial Court set aside the arbitral award in P v D due to unfair credibility findings.
  • Subsequent cases have consistently distinguished factual contexts from P v D rather than rejecting its legal principles.
  • BPY v MXV endorsed the principle of fairness, affirming P v D's emerging status as significant legal precedent.

Abstract

Abstract This case comment examines P v D (2019 EWHC 1277 (Comm)), in which the English Commercial Court set aside an arbitral award under section 68(2)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996—on the ground that the tribunal had breached its duty of procedural fairness under section 33—by making adverse credibility findings against a witness who had not been cross-examined on the core issue in dispute. The comment then traces how three subsequent decisions—Obrascon (2019), Tenke Fungurume (2021), and BPY v MXV (2023)—have treated the precedent, finding a consistent pattern of factual distinction rather than legal rejection. Most significantly, BPY v MXV explicitly endorsed the fairness principle as uncontroversial. The comment concludes that P v D is emerging as binding good law, establishing that arbitrators seated in England breach their section 33 duty—with the consequence of annulment under section 68—when they base adverse credibility findings on matters never put to the witness in cross-examination, a principle with potential reach beyond UK-seated proceedings.

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Sebastián Green Martínez (2025) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a2e47cdb1cc60ccdea8c478https://doi.org/10.1093/arbint/aiaf026
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