Two related problems, problems of (in-)compatibility, are addressed to understand Deleuze’s philosophical project and to deepen our understanding of his use of Spinoza and Bergson: that of the compatible and incompatible features of Spinozism and Bergsonism, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the status of metaphysical compatibilism with respect to freedom in all three of their philosophies. I trace the incompatibilities and insist on the value of reopening the problem partially covered up by Deleuze’s creative engagement. Spinoza and Bergson remain incompatible despite Deleuze’s mixture, and metaphysically, Bergson and Deleuze explicitly affirm the coexistence of incompatible ingredients as constitutive of our very existence and freedom. Some version of metaphysical incompatibilism is affirmed by all three. Life, consciousness, and freedom force us to think of an irreducible incompatibility as constitutive, the coexistence of necessity and freedom, on the one hand, and a movement beyond teleology and mechanism, on the other. Deleuze’s radical pluralism rejects the value of reconciliation and instead deploys an expanding multiplicity of incompatibilities. I flag certain parallels and resonances between Spinoza and Bergson that are not common Deleuzian themes and suggest that Jean-Marie Guyau provides an alternative link to Bergsonism through his spiritualist Spinozism. Despite Bergson’s criticisms of Spinoza, they shared a moral notion of freedom expressed in intellectual generosity, which I characterize as undissociated joy.
John Robert Bagby (Mon,) studied this question.