Introduction. The subject of the study is the participation of Soviet pilots, navigators, and other aviation specialists in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1937. Methods and materials. The first study on the participation of Soviet aviation and aviators in the Spanish Civil War dates back to 1937. Military experts made attempts to generalize the experience of using aviation in the modern war at that time. In the 1950s and 1980s, veterans of the Spanish events published their memoirs, carefully filtered by Soviet censorship. The gradual declassification of archival documents since the 1990s has become the basis for the creation of serious studies on the participation of Soviet aircraft and volunteers from among the flight personnel in the Spanish Civil War. The purpose of the publication is to analyze and present new documentary materials on this issue related to the publication of the first three of the eight collections of documents of the Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Red Army under the general title “The Red Army and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939,” using historical-comparative and historicaldescriptive methods. Analysis. The study established the tactical and technical superiority of Soviet combat aircraft – fighters “I–15,” “I-16,” and high-speed bomber “SB” – over similar aircraft of German and Italian production, which fought on the side of the opponents of the Spanish Republic. The dominance of Soviet pilots in the Spanish sky during the specified period has been established, which is confirmed by the ratio of enemy aircraft shot down and their own lost. It is emphasized that, along with the description of the course of hostilities and their results, Soviet pilots, navigators, and aviation engineers presented to the Red Army their ideas on improving the tactical and technical characteristics of Soviet combat aircraft. It is noted that since the second half of 1937, Soviet pilots have gradually lost their superiority in the skies of Spain due to the appearance of new Germanand Italian-made combat aircraft from the enemy. This is confirmed by reports in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army and reports of military operations. The article considers the issue of excessive combat load of flight personnel and its negative impact on the health of pilots and navigators, as well as issues of the political and moral-psychological state of flight personnel who experienced certain problems associated with an unusual social environment for a Soviet person. Both the commissars and the flight crew state the necessary level of combat discipline, at the same time noting the presence of various excesses. The question of the relations of Soviet military specialists with Spanish colleagues is considered; their friendly nature is emphasized. Results. In general, from 1936 to the first half of 1937, the Soviet aviation surpassed the German and Italian in both the quality of equipment and the skill of the flight crew, as evidenced by the ratio of Republican and Francoist aircraft shot down during that period in air battles. However, as the Francoists received new types of aircraft, the Republicans lost their advantage. Another reason for the loss of air superiority since the second half of 1937 was the replacement of experienced Soviet pilots by untrained youth. Participation in the Spanish War was the first serious test for both the young Soviet aviation as a whole and for individual pilots. In the skies of Spain, Soviet pilots showed miracles of heroism, trying to neutralize the numerical superiority of enemy aircraft. The excessive combat load of the flight crew affected the physical condition of pilots and navigators who did not have conditions for proper rest in 1936–1937. With all the difference in the assessments of the moral and psychological state of the flight crew by the commissars and the pilots themselves, it is necessary to note a generally high level of discipline in the presence of certain deviations.
Mikhail V. Novikov (Thu,) studied this question.