Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Nuclear Weapon Usage

This research paper provides an analysis of nuclear weapon usage in the present-day world through the lens of game theory. Despite the existence of nuclear weapons as the most formidable and threatening form of warfare, this paper explores the reasons behind the non-usage of nuclear weapons despite multiple armed conflicts since its only recorded use in human history in 1945. Through an examination of historical events, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, this paper illustrates how nuclear cooperation has been established to prevent damaging nuclear conflict. Furthermore, this paper generalizes this analysis to the present-day global landscape, highlighting why nuclear weapons exist primarily as deterrents that act as signals rather than active tools of warfare and destruction. This study is grounded in mathematical game-theoretic concepts, although non-mathematical and intuitive explanations of such concepts also exist to provide the reader with a holistic understanding of basic game theory.