This article presents a comprehensive study of the organisational and legal aspects of ensuring Ukraine’s energy security in the context of escalating hybrid threats, which encompass both cyberattacks and assaults involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The relevance of the topic is driven by the heightened vulnerability of energy infrastructure to emerging challenges that have acquired a systemic and critical nature amidst the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Particular attention is given to the analysis of the current state of Ukraine’s regulatory and legal framework in the field of energy security, with an emphasis on identifying key shortcomings in the national legislation. These include the absence of a clearly defined concept of energy security, insufficient coordination among authorised government institutions, and the lack of a unified administrative structure. The study substantiates that cyber threats and drone attacks are integral components of hybrid warfare, which combines military and non-military methods of destabilisation. In this context, Ukraine’s energy sector has become a prime target for systematic and technologically sophisticated attacks, resulting in severe disruptions to energy supply, the destruction of critical infrastructure, significant economic damage, and increased risks to public safety. The article analyses prominent cases of cyberattacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, particularly those involving malicious software such as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and Industroyer2. These incidents underscore the adversary’s technical preparedness and access to industrial control system protocols, which necessitates a high level of cybersecurity readiness on the part of the state. The paper provides an overview of the existing legal framework, including the Laws of Ukraine «On National Security» and «On Critical Infrastructure», and reviews current legislative initiatives aimed at reforming the energy security system. The authors argue for the development of a unified legislative model that includes the constitutional recognition of the status of independent regulatory authorities, a clear delineation of competences among all relevant actors, and the alignment of national legislation with European Union standards. Institutional weaknesses are also discussed, particularly the lack of effective interagency collaboration, limited involvement of local self-government bodies and civil society in ensuring energy security, and the insufficient legal inclusion of private sector entities. The article proposes several measures to strengthen the organisational and legal mechanisms for countering threats to the energy sector. These include the development of public-private partnerships, the implementation of early threat detection systems, the enhancement of digital resilience, and investment in the modernisation of energy facilities to mitigate vulnerabilities. The promotion of renewable energy is also emphasised, not only for environmental considerations but as a means of achieving territorial decentralisation and improving the flexibility and sustainability of the energy system. In conclusion, the authors argue that safeguarding Ukraine’s energy security in the face of hybrid threats requires a comprehensive transformation of the organisational and legal infrastructure. This transformation must be grounded in modern legislative reforms, strategic governance restructuring, and the integration of Ukraine into the broader European energy and security landscape. The findings of this research may serve as a basis for shaping effective public policy in the energy sector, particularly with regard to legal reform, institutional development, and strategic planning.
Timashov et al. (Thu,) studied this question.