Abstract This article explores the concept of equality in Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy through the lens of recognition. While Hobbes famously grounds equality in human beings’ roughly equivalent natural capacities and mutual vulnerability, this paper argues that equality in Hobbes is not merely an ontological fact but a psychological and moral phenomenon requiring mutual recognition. Two dynamics emerge: first, the gap between the objective reality of equality and individuals’ psychological awareness, where pride and resentment shape perceptions of superiority or inferiority; second, equality as a moral norm, foundational for civil society. Contrary to readings that reduce Hobbesian equality to a pragmatic “peace claim,” this study contends that mutual recognition of equality underpins moral law and covenant-making, linking the psychological claim for self-rule to the equal worth of individuals as persons. However, this recognition-oriented view reveals tensions with Hobbes’s political theory, since asserting equality in personhood can threaten sovereign authority and civil stability.
Guido Frilli (Mon,) studied this question.