Abstract This article reconsiders recognition in Hobbes by revisiting Strauss’s influential account to expand the discussion to wider relational and practical contexts. Returning to Leviathan with a revised Straussian perspective helps clarify Hobbes’s explanation for why the natural condition is a condition of war. The fear of violent death which opposes each man to every other is not a natural aversion to death, but a form of self-consciousness that develops across different contexts. Next, building on this revisionist Straussian interpretation, I examine the mutual renunciation of the right to all things as the foundational act of the state. In renouncing their right, I argue, human beings recognize one another not only as potential enemies, but as partners in peace – a recognition that involves a shared risk. Tracing the movement from mutual fear to mutual renunciation of right, I show that Hobbes also envisions recognition as the self-conscious reconfiguration of relations.
Meghan Robison (2025) studied this question.