A cross‐cultural replication of “citizens' blame of politicians for public service failure: Experimental evidence about blame reduction through delegation and contracting”

Abstract Theories of blame suggest that the institutional design of public service delivery affects citizens' blame of politicians for service failure, and that delegation or contracting out reducing citizens' blame of politicians. We replicate experimentally James et al.'s blame study to assess whether the findings still apply in the original, Western context, and if the findings can be generalized to East Asia (Hong Kong and South Korea). Our replications ( N = 3600) show support for contracting out to the private sector as an effective institutional arrangement for politicians to avoid blame—providing evidence for this hypothesized effect that was not found by the original study in England. Blame shift effects are typically weaker in East Asia as anticipated because of cultural differences. Overall, the findings show that politicians can use cues about delegation to reduce citizens' blame for service failure, but that such strategies vary in their success according to context.