How states think: the rationality of foreign policy

How states think challenges conventional wisdom, arguing that states predominantly act rationally.Contrary to the prevailing belief in expected utility maximization, the authors highlight two novel aspects when conceptualizing rationality within information-deficient environments, emphasizing theory-driven leaders and prioritizing process over outcomes.They argue that states act according to goal and strategic rationality at both individual and collective levels.The goal-rational states are primarily motivated to pursue self-preservation or survival and there are two elements central to their approach: decisions are informed by credible theories and a thorough deliberative process.Credible theory refers to a set of realistic assumptions and causal logics, buttressed by empirical claims with solid historical evidence (pp.44-8).Deliberation is characterized as a 'two-step aggregation process', built upon a 'robust and uninhibited' debate and methodical evaluation of options, leading to a definitive decision (pp.65-6).If states deviate from these criteria, they will fall into irrationality.In Mearsheimer and Rosato's framework, non-rational behaviours are exceptions rather than the norm, which emerge out of constraints or unpredictable 'black swan' events in international politics.The subsequent narrative tackles the empirical question: 'Are states actually strategically rational?' (p.17).The authors apply their theory to two types of real-world scenarios: grand strategy and crisis decisions.They examine ten historical cases-five for each scenario-traditionally viewed as non-rational, and they strive to demonstrate otherwise.The case-studies include Germany's pre-First World War decisions; Japan's strategy in the 1930s leading up to Pearl Harbor; and US decisions during both the Cuban Missile Crisis and its post-Cold War NATO expansion.The book also recognizes exceptions to state rationality, citing instances like the US-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.At first glance, this represents a rather neat and sweeping theoretical set-up with attentive historical analyses.Closer examination, however, reveals some conceptual and empirical shortcomings.First, the authors slam a range of theories they deem non-credible, including the clash of civilizations and racial theories.For instance, they critique as lacking empirical backing audience costs theory, which asserts that 'democratically elected leaders … are especially good at signaling their resolve in crises' due to public commitment pressures (p.57).This judgement, however, may not consider more recent research suggesting the viability of public posturing as a signal of resolve across regime types.This is particularly relevant as the book's references are primarily a handful of studies from over a decade ago.Furthermore, it raises a deeper and broader question: Who gets to determine what qualifies as credible?What is deemed credible could be 'later rendered noncredible as new evidence became available ' and vice versa (p.59).The subjective interpretations that emerge out of individual experiences and beliefs further complicate the pursuit of an intersubjective understanding in these assessments.