Consider the decision-making setting where agents elect a panel by expressing both positive and negative preferences. Prominently, in constitutional AI, citizens democratically select a slate of ethical preferences on which a foundation model is to be trained. There, in practice, agents may both approve and disapprove of different ethical principles. Proportionality has been well-studied in computational social choice for approval ballots, but its meaning remains unclear when negative sentiments are also considered. In this work, we propose two conceptually distinct approaches to interpret proportionality in the presence of up and down votes. The first approach treats the satisfaction from electing candidates and the impact of vetoing them as comparable, leading to combined proportionality guarantees. The second approach considers veto power separately, introducing guarantees distinct from traditional proportionality. We formalize axioms for each perspective and examine their satisfiability by suitable adaptations of Phragm\'en's rule, Proportional Approval Voting rule and the Method of Equal Shares.
Kraiczy et al. (Mon,) studied this question.