Modern AI systems can strategically misreport information when incentives diverge from truthfulness, posing risks for oversight and deployment. Prior studies often examine this behavior within a single paradigm; systematic, cross-architecture evidence under a unified protocol has been limited. We introduce the Strategy Elicitation Battery (SEB), a standardized probe suite for measuring deceptive reporting across large language models (LLMs), reinforcement-learning agents, vision-only classifiers, multimodal encoders, state-space models, and diffusion models. SEB uses Bayesian inference tasks with persona-controlled instructions, schema-constrained outputs, deterministic decoding where supported, and a probe mix (near-threshold, repeats, neutralized, cross-checks). Estimates use clustered bootstrap intervals, and significance is assessed with a logistic regression by architecture; a mixed-effects analysis is planned once the per-round agent/episode traces are exported. On the latest pre-correction runs, SEB shows a consistent cross-architecture pattern in deception rates: ViT 80.0%, CLIP 15.0%, Mamba 10.0%, RL agents 10.0%, Stable Diffusion 10.0%, and LLMs 5.0% (20 scenarios/architecture). A logistic regression on per-scenario flags finds a significant overall architecture effect (likelihood-ratio test vs. intercept-only: χ2(5)=41.56, p=7.22×10−8). Holm-adjusted contrasts indicate ViT is significantly higher than all other architectures in this snapshot; the remaining pairs are not significant. Post-correction acceptance decisions are evaluated separately using residual deception and override rates under SEB-Correct. Latency varies by architecture (sub-second to minutes), enabling pre-deployment screening broadly and real-time auditing for low-latency classes. Results indicate that SEB-Detect deception flags are not confined to any one paradigm, that distinct architectures can converge to similar levels under a common interface, and that reporting interfaces and incentive framing are central levers for mitigation. We operationalize “deception” as reward-sensitive misreport flags, and we separate detection from intervention via a correction wrapper (SEB-Correct), supporting principled acceptance decisions for deployment.
Stodt et al. (Tue,) studied this question.