Scholars and practitioners of international relations and security studies view technological capabilities in general, and digital ones in particular, as crucial to enhancing state power. Among other things, digital technologies sharpen intelligence, thus reducing the likelihood of strategic surprise by improving situational awareness and strengthening deterrence. Yet the empirical record of the early twenty-first century presents a paradox: states with highly advanced digital infrastructures remain vulnerable to unexpected strategic shocks, including intelligence failures. This article develops a conceptual framework, techno-digital vulnerability, that explains why digital superiority can paradoxically increase susceptibility to strategic surprise. Drawing on international relations theory, this article identifies four interrelated mechanisms: illusions of informational completeness; structural dependence on digital systems; hypervisibility of digitally open societies; and the systematic undervaluation of low-tech adversaries. The argument is illustrated through the case of Israel’s failure to foresee the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023. The article concludes by outlining the implications for digitally advanced democracies and for the study of strategic surprise in IR.
Ehud Eiran (Sun,) studied this question.