Abstract The article applies Jessop’s and Hay’s strategic–relational approach to the European Union’s enlargement policy. Focusing on the leaders of applicant countries, the authors argue that these are reflexive actors, who may break the confines of the structurally determined compliance/non-compliance binary choice in European Union (EU) accession negotiations and explore additional policy options. In the Western Balkans, governing elites have repeatedly attempted to make the European Union dilute its accession conditions by presenting the EU institutions with their preferred policy dilemmas. The authors term this practice “reversed conditionality”. The article examines two cases of reversed conditionality: Serbia’s alliance with Russia and the threat of unification of Albania and Kosovo. With these case studies, the authors provide a comparative assessment of the effects of such practice for both its initiators and the EU’s enlargement policy.
Tzifakis et al. (Mon,) studied this question.