Abstract In this article, I would like to map out a path towards a relationalaccount of criminal wrongdoing that is as comprehensive as possible. Specifically, I argue thatcrimes affecting individuals involve the violation of intersubjective, bipolar duties. In this regard,I will directly address the prevailing understanding of crimes as impersonal wrongs, which Iconsider an obstacle to this project (1): I will demonstrate how it is conceptually feasible tomove beyond this ‘impersonal’ paradigm towards a ‘relational’ one (2). This shift is not merelytheoretical: bipolar duties and relational wrongs are, in fact, embedded in the way substantivecriminal law functions (3). Importantly, this does not imply a loss of the public dimension ofcrime, but rather its enrichment through an intersubjective dimension of wrongdoing (4). Finally,I will propose potential avenues for future research within the framework of a relationalparadigm in criminal law theory (5).
Philipp-Alexander Hirsch (Mon,) studied this question.