The promotion of shore power is a key pathway for reducing port-related emissions and achieving sustainable maritime development. This study analyzes the strategic interactions among governments, ports, and shipping companies by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model. Specifically, it addresses three core questions: (1) how stakeholders’ initial intentions and strategic choices influence the system’s evolutionary path and eventual equilibrium; (2) how critical parameters—including subsidies for shore power infrastructure, wind turbine installation, and ship retrofitting, as well as electricity price support, carbon pricing, and policy implementation costs—shape the dynamics of the system and the equilibrium strategies of the three parties; and (3) how heterogeneity in national energy mixes, particularly the roles of wind turbine, affects decision-making behaviors across different countries. Simulation experiments are conducted to explore the effects of varying policy interventions and energy conditions on the stability of cooperative strategies. The results provide insights into the design of differentiated policy instruments that promote shore power adoption while accounting for the structural characteristics of national energy systems. This research enriches the theoretical application of evolutionary game theory to maritime sustainability and offers practical guidance for governments and stakeholders in advancing decarbonization in the port and shipping sectors.
Yuan et al. (Mon,) studied this question.