I present the outlines of a new pragmatist philosophy of science. I aim to develop a realistic philosophical vision of scientific knowledge, with direct relevance to scientific work and also social and political life. Epistemology and the philosophy of science should be re-oriented by taking knowledge primarily as the ability to do things (“active knowledge”), not merely as the possession of information (propositional knowledge). The pragmatist evaluation of knowledge is made in terms of “operational coherence”, the quality of aim-oriented coordination in activities. Operational coherence serves as the cornerstone of other key concepts, including truth and reality. I reformulate James’s pragmatist notion of truth as “truth-by-operational-coherence”: a proposition is true to the extent that there are operationally coherent activities that can be performed by relying on it. Another major aspect of pragmatist philosophy of science is a focus on learning (or, the growth of knowledge). As Dewey emphasized, learning includes the learning of methods, which often happens in the same process as the learning of content. Method-learning is an empirical process, and even logical rules are only pragmatically justified, as C. I. Lewis also argued. The deep empiricism exhibited in Lewis’s and Dewey’s views of logic and methodology points to the continuity of knowledge and inquiry in most realms of life. A shared commitment to truth-by-operational-coherence has the potential to bring together people from all walks of life and various political, religious and ethical persuasions. In this context, science can serve as an exemplary empiricist enterprise.
Hasok Chang (Thu,) studied this question.