In many markets, firms tend to allocate resources toward attracting attention rather than improving underlying value. This paper documents a Recurring Capture Pattern (RCP) observed in attention-based economic and information systems. Under the institutional condition of evaluation and revenue structures that monetize attention acquisition and allow unconstrained expansion of advertising and promotional investment, individually rational behavior systematically converges not toward sustained real value creation, but toward maximization of short-term outcomes through attention acquisition. As these behaviors accumulate, they alter the operational conditions of the system itself, resulting in market evaluation structures and competitive conditions increasingly favoring attention-based investment, and reinforcing the same behavioral convergence through a recursive institutional feedback loop. The pattern ultimately produces a structural suppression of real value investment and a market structure dominated by attention competition, indicating a structural misalignment between institutional objectives and rational behavioral adaptation. This paper analytically describes the structural relationship between institutional design and rational behavioral adaptation. The document does not propose policy implementation, funding structures, benefit levels, or normative policy evaluation, but instead presents design principles and operational modules as analytical references for institutional design.
Hiromi Shimamoto (Thu,) studied this question.