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Most of us effortlessly describe visual objects, whether seen or remembered. Yet, around 4% of people report congenital aphantasia: they struggle to visualize objects despite being able to describe their visual appearance. What neural mechanisms create this disparity between subjective experience and objective performance? Aphantasia can provide novel insights into conscious processing and awareness. We used ultra-high field 7T fMRI to establish the neural circuits involved in visual mental imagery and perception, and to elucidate the neural mechanisms associated with the processing of internally generated visual information in the absence of imagery experience in congenital aphantasia. Ten typical imagers and 10 aphantasic individuals performed imagery and perceptual tasks in five domains: object shape, object color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships. In typical imagers, imagery tasks activated left-hemisphere frontoparietal areas, the relevant domain-preferring areas in the ventral temporal cortex partly overlapping with the perceptual domain-preferring areas, and a domain-general area in the left fusiform gyrus (the Fusiform Imagery Node). The results were valid for each individual participant. In aphantasic individuals, imagery activated similar visual areas, but there was reduced functional connectivity between the Fusiform Imagery Node and frontoparietal areas. Our results unveil the domain-general and domain-specific circuits of visual mental imagery, their functional disorganization in aphantasia, and support the general hypothesis that conscious visual experience - whether perceived or imagined - depends on the integrated activity of high-level visual cortex and frontoparietal networks.
Liu et al. (Thu,) studied this question.