Evolutionary Game Study of Waste Separation Policy in the Context of the “Double Carbon” Target

Research on waste separation promotion policies is of great theoretical and practical significance for the universal implementation of the domestic waste separation system. This paper constructs a non-cooperative tripartite evolutionary game model that includes central command, local deployment, and enterprise performance. An evolutionary game approach was used to analyze the strategic choices of the central government, local government, and separation enterprises in waste separation promotion, and this study investigated the factors influencing the evolution of these choices using numerical simulations. The findings indicated the following: central government, local governments, and separation enterprises are affected differently by their respective willingness to participate; the behavior of separation enterprises is less influenced by the central government’s and local governments’ willingness to participate and is primarily influenced by market factors, whereas local government is more influenced by the central government’s willingness to participate; and local government and classification enterprises are affected differently by their respective willingness to participate. While separation firms are more susceptible to the cost-sharing, income, and revenue distribution coefficient, local governments are more responsive to policy support. The promotion of waste separation in China requires strengthened centralized waste management to avoid the failure of local waste separation, broadening of the scope of central funding incentives and establishing local separation compensation mechanisms, clarifying local waste separation performance responsibilities and new waste tax collection standards, supporting separation enterprises’ technological innovation and guiding public participation in waste separation, creating an environment for waste separation, and deepening the study of waste separation accordingly.