Purpose The construction supply chain balances economic and environmental benefits via low-carbon operations, yet uneven cost-benefit distribution among stakeholders hinders emission reduction efforts. This study examines stakeholder incentives and decision-making to advance low-carbon transformation. Design/methodology/approach This study employs the method of evolutionary game theory. As strategies adapt dynamically to external changes, we construct a government-supplier-manufacturer evolutionary game model, analyzing equilibrium strategies and key parameter impacts. Findings Findings reveal: (1) Government subsidies have a nonlinear threshold effect, and exceeding the optimal range will lead to a decline in policy efficiency and a decline in supervisory motivation. (2) The penalty mechanism is more robust than the incentive measures, and plays an irreplaceable and fundamental role in setting the bottom line for emission reduction and guiding system coordination. (3) Negative public supervision is a powerful force driving strict government supervision, and its effectiveness is significantly better than positive publicity. Originality/value This study has clear implications for current environmental policies. Its conclusions challenge the traditional idea of over-reliance on fiscal subsidies and demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of shifting the policy focus to build a constraint governance framework with “strict supervision and information disclosure” as the core.
Jiang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.