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Abstract Saudi Arabia and Iran played roles, inadvertently or not, in enabling the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023. Before the war that ensued, Tehran aided and funded Hamas and its military wing, the Izz al‐Din al‐Qassam Brigades. Riyadh shunned the group by arresting and extraditing its members in a bid to join the US‐backed Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, a move that could lead to alliances to contain Iran. The Hamas assault thwarted the Saudi‐Israeli normalization plans, at least in the short term, and gave Iran a chance to engage with the kingdom. The Islamic Republic urged Saudi Arabia to spoil the war by supporting a quick ceasefire, which could have enabled Hamas to regroup when Israeli forces advanced into Gaza. This article shows that the niche diplomacy to halt the fighting exposed the lurking rivalries and limited capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia. By not seeking a permanent solution to build peace or subvert the cyclical nature of the most enduring conflict in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Iran were sidelined by the United States when it built the first phase of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas by mid‐January 2025.
Banafsheh Keynoush (Sat,) studied this question.