Judith Butler has been one of the most influential philosophers since the late 1980s. Despite her prominence, her idea of recognition has been persistently misinterpreted by both its proponents and critics. Given the circumstances, this study has three objectives. First, it examines how Butler understands recognition in her dissertation Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France. She develops her theory of recognition by interpreting Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit, following the basic line of the twentieth-century French reception of Hegel. For her, recognition is inseparable from subject formation, which she conceives in terms of desire and embodied freedom. Second, Butler's recognition theory becomes more distinct than that of Axel Honneth. The central differences between the thinking of the two philosophers lie in their conception of subject formation. Butler conceives the subject as a being always at risk of self-loss, whereas Honneth, in a perfectionist manner, posits an integral and unified subject. Third, while rejecting the misinterpretations of Butlerian theory that favour her idea of recognition, this study identifies several defects within her account of recognition. Her incorrect understanding of the Phenomenology of Sprit is problematic not only because it departs from Hegel's original text but also because it undermines the coherence and validity of her own philosophical position.
Atsushi Kubo (Wed,) studied this question.