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E-commerce interest linkage mechanisms serve as an effective solution to the problems of farmer–market cooperation, agricultural supply-side reforms, and farmers’ income growth. This study, guided by the theory of planned behavior, undertook an evolutionary game analysis of farmer–enterprise cooperation with government interventions with farmers. Based on data from 554 questionnaires administered in Mei County, Shaanxi Province, China, this study found a difference between the realistic and optimal choices of farmers. In addition, this study used a structural equation model to investigate the influence of government policies and farmers’ cognition on the participation willingness and behaviors of farmers in e-commerce interest-linkage mechanisms. The results showed that the optimal choice for farmers in a farmer–enterprise cooperative game is participation in e-commerce, and government policies can be used to improve farmer–enterprise e-commerce interest-linkage mechanisms. Farmers’ basic characteristics and experiences impacted their cognition of e-commerce, which, in turn, had a significant positive effect on their e-commerce participation willingness and behaviors. Government policies had a positive effect on farmers’ experiences, cognition of e-commerce, and participation behaviors, but no direct positive impact on farmers’ willingness to participate. Government policies and farmers’ basic characteristics interacted and acted together on the participation willingness and behavior of farmers.
Wei et al. (Thu,) studied this question.