The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation

The United has struggled with the challenges of globalization for several years, especially since the Asian financial crisis. It has paid particular attention the needs of developing countries, deemed least well equipped cope. All relevant parts of the UN system have been engaged, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization. In the process, the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) has gained new life--and, as of 2000, a new name: the Chief Executives Board (CEB). Since 1998, it has become the venue for a series of discussions, including at informal retreats initiated by Secretary-General Annan, in which the executive heads have explored the different dimensions of globalization and debated appropriate policy approaches by which the UN system as a whole can help better manage its risks and secure its benefits. One paramount concern has emerged from these reflections: the need achieve a greater degree of policy coherence at national and international levels alike in response the integrated challenges that globalization poses) Globalization does not come in tidy sectoral or geographically demarcated packages. It is all about interconnections--among people; across states; in production networks and financial markets; between greed and grievance; among failing states, terrorism, and criminal networks; between nature and society. The complex interrelatedness of issues and their cumulative, often unforeseen, consequences demand far greater policy coherence than the existing system of national and international institutions has been able muster. This article provides a brief analytical overview of innovative efforts by the UN achieve greater coherence in the face of globalization. It is intended be illustrative, not exhaustive. It examines five instances of this quest and draws some lessons from them: the greater convergence of views about globalization among the main UN actors and other multilateral institutions; the formulation of clear systemwide priorities for poverty eradication and related development targets; the endeavor better coordinate the development assistance that international agencies provide at the country level; some of the UN's work in information and communication technology intended help bridge the digital divide; and the Global Compact, engaging global business advance UN social and environmental principles. But first, some prefatory remarks about the UN system's architecture are in order. The Institutional Matrix When the post-World War II system of international organizations was created, its founders deliberately designed it be decentralized. Different international institutions were built upon and governed by their national counterparts--be they foreign ministries, treasuries, or departments of agriculture, health, education, and labor. This arrangement, it was felt, held two advantages. First, it was believed maximize the scope of technical expertise and minimize politicization. Not only the major states but also middle powers were strong advocates of this view; Canadian officials, for example, referred it as the theory and practice of functionalism. (2) Second, it was felt that such a structure would be more firmly rooted in the most interested segments of domestic society, thereby providing strong and organic support for the international enterprise. This was a particular concern of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had struggled mightily overcome the forces of American isolationism in the interwar period. (3) It is true that the UN Charter authorizes the Economic and Social Council enter into agreements with the agencies defining the terms on which they shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations (Article 63.1), and coordinate their activities through consultations with and recommendations to the agencies themselves, the General Assembly, or member states (Article 63. …