ABSTRACT: This study examines the problems associated with counterbalancing and ethnic stacking as coup-proofing strategies used by Omar Bashir in Sudan. During Bashir’s regime (1989–2019), active coercive structures were established through the fragmentation and ethnicization of the state security apparatus to maintain regime stability. This paper argues that the ethnic stacking and counterbalancing tactics employed during Bashir’s rule were effective in preserving the regime’s survival for three decades; yet, they eventually sowed the seeds of his downfall, led by the military during the 2019 revolt. A crucial lesson can be drawn from Sudan: that coup-proofing actions, such as the fragmentation of the security apparatus and the establishment of a co-ethnic army, can render leaders vulnerable to military defections and be overthrown during uprisings. Autocrats who deploy and maintain an ethnic army and paramilitary institutions for regime survival undermine and weaken the military’s ability to defend their regime against threats during uprisings.
Olukayode Bakare (Sun,) studied this question.