A framework for truthful online auctions in cloud computing with heterogeneous user demands

The paradigm of cloud computing has spontaneously prompted a wide interest in market-based resource allocation mechanisms by which a cloud provider aims at efficiently allocating cloud resources among potential users. Among these mechanisms, auction-style pricing policies, as they can effectively reflect the underlying trends in demand and supply for the computing resources, have attracted a research interest recently. This paper conducts the first work on a framework for truthful online cloud auctions where users with heterogeneous demands could come and leave on the fly. Our framework desirably supports a variety of design requirements, including (1) dynamic design for timely reflecting fluctuation of supply-demand relations, (2) joint design for supporting the heterogeneous user demands, and (3) truthful design for discouraging bidders from cheating behaviors. Concretely speaking, we first design a novel bidding language, wherein users' heterogeneous demands are generalized to regulated and consistent forms. Besides, building on top of our bidding language we propose COCA, an incentive-Compatible (truthful) Online Cloud Auction mechanism based on two proposed guidelines. Our theoretical analysis shows that the worst-case performance of COCA can be well-bounded. Further, in simulations the performance of COCA is seen to be comparable to the well-known off-line Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism 11.