Climate finance is a critical component of climate policy implementation, but disparities in access reflect the broader power imbalances between the Global North and the Global South, and shape both the allocation of funds and the types of projects that receive support. This paper examines the politics of decision-making within the Green Climate Fund (GCF), revealing how structural power asymmetries, strategic negotiation, and ideological biases shape outcomes. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of board meeting transcripts, survey responses of accredited entities, and a review of imposed conditions on approved proposals, the study reveals that although the GCF is formally grounded in principles of consensus and inclusivity, board deliberations in practice reflect patterns of distributive bargaining. Developed country board members routinely leverage their financial and institutional influence to define key concepts, such as “efficiency,” “climate rationale,” and “paradigm shift” and to impose conditionalities that disadvantage low-income countries. These dynamics particularly hinder equitable access to adaptation finance, where requirements like co-financing and private sector alignment place disproportionate burdens on vulnerable nations. Civil society observers and developing country members, while procedurally present, are often sidelined in substantive decision-making. Ultimately, the GCF serves not as a neutral technical platform but as a contested site of geopolitical power. The findings underscore the need for structural reform to enhance transparency, empower Direct Access Entities, and ensure meaningful participation of developing countries and civil society, without which the Fund risks reinforcing the very inequities it was created to redress.
Ahmed et al. (Fri,) studied this question.