This manuscript proposes a structural framework for analyzing theories of consciousness independently of their ontological commitments. Inspired by Shannon's separation of information from semantic content, the paper asks whether consciousness science admits an analogous ontology-independent invariant. The central proposal is to treat theories of consciousness as realization relations between physical histories and experiential propositions. Rather than assuming a particular metaphysical account of consciousness, the framework focuses on experimentally accessible distinctions arising from discrimination, report, and observation. These distinctions naturally generate a logical and topological structure that may be represented using frames, locales, and related categorical constructions. The paper develops continuity and locality as general constraints on realization relations and explores the possibility that the frame of experiential propositions serves as a common structural object shared by diverse theories of consciousness. Connections to locale theory, generalized truth values, and proposition-based approaches in the foundations of physics are discussed. This work is intended as a conceptual and mathematical research program rather than a completed theory of consciousness. Its aim is to provide a common formal setting in which competing theories may be compared and analyzed while remaining agnostic about the ultimate nature of conscious experience.
Lily Goldschmied Chale (2026) studied this question.