The rapid expansion of digital asset markets has transformed commercial exchange while exposing structural tensions between private dispute resolution and mandatory public regulation. As English law has evolved to recognize cryptoassets as property, disputes concerning ownership, fraud, platform governance, and regulatory compliance have proliferated, with arbitration emerging as a preferred mechanism for their resolution. However, the deployment of arbitration in consumer-facing digital asset markets raises difficult questions about the limits of party autonomy where statutory rights and public policy are engaged. This article critically examines those limits through a close analysis of Payward, Inc. d/ b/a Kraken, Payward Ventures, Inc. & Payward Ltd v. Chechetkin, situating the decision within the broader framework of the Arbitration Act 1996 (as amended in 2025) and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). It argues that Payward reveals three interrelated constraints on arbitral autonomy: the non-derogable character of statutory consumer protection, the principled operation of public policy at the enforcement stage, and the heightened scrutiny applied to standard-form arbitration clauses in cross-border digital transactions. Far from signalling hostility to arbitration, the decision reflects a recalibration of arbitral autonomy in regulatory contexts. The article concludes that, in an increasingly mature and regulated digital asset market, arbitration remains viable only to the extent that it operates consistently with mandatory consumer and financial regulatory norms
Ali et al. (Thu,) studied this question.