The article examines the conditions for set-theoretic paradoxes proposed by Borisov, as well as his critique of Ladov’s approach to a unified solution to the paradoxes. It is shown that Borisov’s position faces two difficulties. Firstly, the proposed distinction between types I and II of set-theoretic paradoxes is not entirely relevant. At the very least, Richard’s paradox, one of the conditions of which Borisov defines as a linguistic aspect, can be interpreted without the use of linguistic concepts. Secondly, the proposed terminology (negative and positive formulas) is relevant only formally, while in reality it is speculative in nature. Additionally, the issue of considering the derivability of a contradiction from a self-referential premise as a necessary condition for set-theoretic paradoxes is addressed.
Alexandr G. Andrushkevich (Wed,) studied this question.