How do states navigate cooperation and coercion in the governance of labor migration? This article introduces a novel framework for understanding strategic behavior in migration diplomacy, grounded in the concept of migration interdependence. It argues that state strategy is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of exposure to the consequences of disrupted migration flows. When stronger states are more exposed, cooperation becomes rational; when stronger states are less exposed, or when weaker states possess credible alternatives, coercion becomes viable. The article develops a two-axis typology to explain these dynamics and applies it to four bilateral labor migration corridors: New Zealand–Pacific Islands, Russia–Central Asia, Gulf States–Nepal, and Malaysia–Indonesia. These cases span Global South and South–North relationships, allowing for controlled comparison across varied structural configurations. Methodologically, the article employs a focused comparative approach combining process tracing and a structured typological framework, drawing on primary and secondary sources to triangulate evidence and elucidate variation across migration corridors. It identifies four factors that condition states’ strategic options: remittance dependency, labor market reliance, migration portfolio diversification, and institutionalization. The article advances migration studies by reconceptualizing labor mobility as a site of deliberate, strategic state engagement rather than a passive byproduct of domestic pressures. Simultaneously, it enriches international relations theory by offering a nuanced understanding of how power and migration interdependence intertwine to shape state behavior within asymmetric contexts. By identifying conditions that enable coercion, the article offers a critical policy tool for anticipating and mitigating exploitative practices in migration diplomacy.
Gerasimos Tsourapas (Mon,) studied this question.