Criminal Institutions and the Market for Justice in Urban Brazil

Why do some criminal groups institutionalize their punishment of civilians, while others use violence arbitrarily? Conventional wisdom associates gang rule with the erratic use of force. In São Paulo, however, the Primeiro Comando da Capital operates a complex judicial system. This paper proposes that gang justice is a transaction between illicit actors and communities which results in different outcomes depending on the values of two variables: the population’s interest in extralegal punishment (which drives demand); and the state’s threat to criminals (which drives supply). I argue that São Paulo is characterized by an unusual combination of high civilian demand for extrajudicial enforcement and a salient police threat to gangs. The result is that criminals are able to secure the cooperation of justice-deprived citizens, but only if they hold themselves to a high judicial standard. I support this argument with evidence from interviews and a subnational comparison of cases from Brazil.